Revolutions and reform need good guys and bad guys. The good guys fight the bad guys who're engaged in wrongdoing. This is a matter of accountability. Having an establishment at which fingers can be pointed gives it, the establishment, neat steps to take to improve. If there isn't a distinct two-group divide, such as the one between protesters and the establishment - that is, if there is a milieu of protesters in a society or a population full of the government's men - there is no engine of change, no object that can change; in all, there will be no change. Egypt under Mubarak gave us a glimpse into what good guy vs. bad guy looks like. With the "president" deposed and Egypt then under military rule led by former vice-president Shafiq, protesters were given a target, sure. Shafiq's reformation of the constitution, for instance, which gave executive, judicial and legislative powers to the military council, indeed, even after the election, constructed this target. But the military council as a target was forgotten or, at least, was put on the back-burner as various political factions formed, the two most prominent of which are the party led by ElBaradei and the Muslim Brotherhood. But there were other clashes, as well. Salafi Muslims attacked the Coptic churches of Imbaba neighborhood, Cairo. Regardless, there was a distinct drop in solidarity from the days of Tahrir Square - though, like the 21 November protests of solidarity, in which Coptic Christians stood in guard as Muslims did prayer, there were glimpses. In the post-Spring Egypt, or at least in this new Egypt that has passed through this phase of marked solidarity forged by a clear sense of accountability and another phase of antagonism with a semi-fixed accountability, the people have become creatures of democracy - while acting to preserve and/or create policy they desire, activists are not calling for the destruction of a part or the whole government - while the establishment refuses to do it's part in the democratic process.
Much like before, today's Egypt has a target, an accountable establishment, the Mursi government, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood political party. However, the mechanism for holding it accountable has been far less organized or built-in than promised. Mursi, in his early days as President of the nation, had promised to build a cabinet that crossed Egypt's vast demographic spectrum. In return, he had appointed a Coptic intellectual, Samir Morcos, and Sukaina Faud. Whether or not the math suggests it, this sort of representation in the cabinet does not hold water for many Egyptians. Mursi's promise of tolerance has been dramatically cut short. Despite his appointees to cabinet, the PM and his government has distanced itself further from this goal. Mursi has given himself a tremendous set of powers, while pinning a referendum of a hastily drafted constitution.
In this political climate, a movement has emerged against Mursi and the MB. Led by the likes of former IAEA chief ElBaradei and former presidential candidates, Sabahi and Moussa, the secular left has formed the Salvation Front, gathering within it not just the elite, as MB has claimed. Indeed, SF has become a popular force, evidenced recently by the protests it organized outside the presidential palace. Shockingly enough, the reaction of the MB and the establishment as a whole has been to repress these movements, much like their ancestors, rather than to allow them, the movement's people, to help forge policy and reforms. The state police had thrown tear gas and engaged in violence against a growing body of protesters in front of the presidential palace. Yet, more importantly, the prosecutor-general of Egypt has indicted the chief architect of the SF movement, ElBaradei, with espionage and a Zionist-inspired conspiracy - all in all, a plan to overthrow the president of Egypt.
Egypt's people have risen in democratic fervor against their still backwardly authoritarian government. While the people engage in the SF movement and hold protests demanding a policy, the government refuses to pass said policy. Certainly, complacency is the essence of democratic government. Philosophical and more rigid principles aside, this is also perhaps the most logical reaction to such an overwhelming movement, notwithstanding its simplicity. Yet the establishment purposefully does the more difficult, complicated and even expensive action. It represses the dissenters. Thus, the government continues a tradition long held in human history, repression, a more complicated reaction than complacency that does only one thing and Egypt is an exemplar of this phenomenon. While repression perpetuates for a limited time the government's agenda, the cigar finally goes to the people. Indeed, once they fight, the people win, so good guy/bad guy is the basic template required of a good revolution/reformation. But there is a certain second phase: governmental complacency. Though MB's Egypt is yet to see this, it sure is a-coming. It's in the Egyptian people's blood, their recent ancestry
Much like before, today's Egypt has a target, an accountable establishment, the Mursi government, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood political party. However, the mechanism for holding it accountable has been far less organized or built-in than promised. Mursi, in his early days as President of the nation, had promised to build a cabinet that crossed Egypt's vast demographic spectrum. In return, he had appointed a Coptic intellectual, Samir Morcos, and Sukaina Faud. Whether or not the math suggests it, this sort of representation in the cabinet does not hold water for many Egyptians. Mursi's promise of tolerance has been dramatically cut short. Despite his appointees to cabinet, the PM and his government has distanced itself further from this goal. Mursi has given himself a tremendous set of powers, while pinning a referendum of a hastily drafted constitution.
In this political climate, a movement has emerged against Mursi and the MB. Led by the likes of former IAEA chief ElBaradei and former presidential candidates, Sabahi and Moussa, the secular left has formed the Salvation Front, gathering within it not just the elite, as MB has claimed. Indeed, SF has become a popular force, evidenced recently by the protests it organized outside the presidential palace. Shockingly enough, the reaction of the MB and the establishment as a whole has been to repress these movements, much like their ancestors, rather than to allow them, the movement's people, to help forge policy and reforms. The state police had thrown tear gas and engaged in violence against a growing body of protesters in front of the presidential palace. Yet, more importantly, the prosecutor-general of Egypt has indicted the chief architect of the SF movement, ElBaradei, with espionage and a Zionist-inspired conspiracy - all in all, a plan to overthrow the president of Egypt.
Egypt's people have risen in democratic fervor against their still backwardly authoritarian government. While the people engage in the SF movement and hold protests demanding a policy, the government refuses to pass said policy. Certainly, complacency is the essence of democratic government. Philosophical and more rigid principles aside, this is also perhaps the most logical reaction to such an overwhelming movement, notwithstanding its simplicity. Yet the establishment purposefully does the more difficult, complicated and even expensive action. It represses the dissenters. Thus, the government continues a tradition long held in human history, repression, a more complicated reaction than complacency that does only one thing and Egypt is an exemplar of this phenomenon. While repression perpetuates for a limited time the government's agenda, the cigar finally goes to the people. Indeed, once they fight, the people win, so good guy/bad guy is the basic template required of a good revolution/reformation. But there is a certain second phase: governmental complacency. Though MB's Egypt is yet to see this, it sure is a-coming. It's in the Egyptian people's blood, their recent ancestry
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